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A new class of attacks on time series data 
mining1 
Ye Zhua,∗, Yongjian Fua and Huirong Fub 
aDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA 
bDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, USA 
Abstract. Traditional research on preserving privacy in data mining focuses on time-invariant privacy issues. With the 
emergence of time series data mining, traditional snapshot-based privacy issues need to be extended to be multi-dimensional 
with the addition of time dimension. We find current techniques to preserve privacy in data mining are not effective in preserving 
time-domain privacy. We present the data flow separation attack on privacy in time series data mining, which is based on blind 
source separation techniques from statistical signal processing. Our experiments with real data show that this attack is effective. 
By combining the data flow separation method and the frequency matching method, an attacker can identify data sources and 
compromise time-domain privacy. We propose possible countermeasures to the data flow separation attack in the paper. 
Keywords: Privacy, time series data mining, blind source separation 
1. Introduction 
With the popularity of data mining, privacy issues have been a serious concern. Most research on 
privacy issues in data mining focuses on privacy preserving data mining, i.e., how to mine data while 
protecting the identity of data owners. Various approaches have been proposed to conduct data mining 
without breaching of privacy [1–6]. However, privacy issues studied in previous research are on time-
invariant data which do not change over time. In other words, the data can be viewed as a snap-shot of 
objects. 
Time series data mining has become popular recently. The goal of time series data mining is to find 
pattens contained in time series data [7–16]. In time series data mining, the data to be mined is labeled 
with timestamps. One example is the daily stock price. For time series data, because of the temporal 
information contained in the data, its privacy goes beyond the protection of data. In this paper, when the 
meaning of privacy is unclear from context, we call the privacy in time-invariant data mining snap-shot 
privacy, and the privacy in time series data mining time series privacy. 
We focus on time series privacy issues in this paper. As snap-shot privacy issues arise from snap-shot 
based data mining, time series privacy issues arise from time series data mining. Time series privacy 
issues concern about changes in data over time. We need to protect data, as well as its properties in time 
1A preliminary version of the paper appeared in the 2008 Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
(PAKDD 2008). 
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and frequency domains. For example, sales data on a car model changes over time, but the manufacturer 
of the car model will worry about sharing the sales data with data miners because the sales data may 
indicate changes in financial situation or marketing strategies of the manufacturer over time. Another 
example is that a store may not be willing to share its sales data because a data miner may find out 
promotion periods of the store by checking periodicities contained in the data provided by the store. 
We argue that privacy in time series data involves protection of properties in time domain such as peak, 
trough, and trend, and properties in frequency domain, such as periodicity. Such properties reveal lots 
of information, even though they do not reveal data. 
Two common approaches have been proposed to preserve snap-shot privacy in data mining. One 
approach is data perturbation in which data to be mined is modified to protect privacy. The other 
approach is data partitioning in which data is split among multiple parties and each party only see its 
share of the data. One method in data perturbation approach is aggregation in which time series data 
from different sources are aggregated and given to data miners. This can prevent data miners from 
finding private information about individual sources. For example, auto manufacturers usually do not 
want to publish daily, monthly or yearly sales data of individual car model because too much sensitive 
information is contained in the time series data. Instead, trusted market research companies aggregate 
sales data of different car models made by different auto manufacturers and publish these aggregated 
data for data mining or market study. These time series data can be aggregated in different ways such as 
according to vehicle types or vehicle features for different purposes. 
In this research, we found that current techniques to protect snap-shot privacy were largely ineffective 
under data flow separation attacks, which can separate aggregated data and separate noise from original 
data. The data flow separation attack employs the blind source separation model [17], which was 
originally defined to solve the cocktail party problem: blind source separation algorithms can extract 
one person’s voice signal given the mixtures of voices in a cocktail party. 
Our experiments show that data flow separation can separate independent time series data generated 
from different sources. 
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
– We introduce the concept of privacy in time series data mining. Because of the nature of time series 
data, privacy issues in time series data mining go beyond these in snap-shot data mining, especially 
privacy in time and frequency domains. We believe it is important to preserve privacy in time series 
data as well as in snap-shot data. 
– We present data flow separation attack and show that aggregation is not always enough to protect 
time series privacy. We use experiments on real data to show that data flow separation attacks are 
effective. 
– We present the frequency matching attack, a further attack based on data flow separation attacks, 
which can fully disclose sensitive information of data sources. 
– We discuss the pros and cons of countermeasures to data flow separation attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related work in privacy preserving data 
mining and time series data mining. We list time series privacy issues in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the 
threat model. In Section 5, we introduce the data flow separation attack. We will also describe frequency 
matching that can be used as further attacks. In Section 6, we use experiments on real stock data to show 
the effectiveness of the data flow separation attack. Section 7 discusses countermeasures for the data 
flow separation attack. We conclude this paper in Section 8, with remarks on extensions of this work. 
2. Related work 
2.1. Privacy preserving data mining 
The main approaches to privacy-preserving data mining can be divided into two categories: data 
perturbation and data partitioning. 
In data perturbation approaches, original data is modified by data obscuration or by adding random 
noises. An example of data obscuration consists on replacing values of a continuous variable with ranges. 
Distributions of random noises are usually known, such as the even distribution or normal distribution. 
The modified data is given to data miners. Algorithms have been developed to mine decision trees [1] and 
association rules [2] in data with noise. Techniques for improving randomization are also proposed [3, 
18,19]. 
In data partitioning approaches to privacy preserving data mining, the original data is distributed among 
multiple parties, either by the partitioning of centralized data or by the nature of the data collection. The 
data mining process is split into local computation at individual sites and global computation. During 
the process, each party does not see other party’s data, but cooperates to find global patterns. In almost 
all cases, secure multi-party computation [20] and encryptions are employed. Secure algorithms for 
decision tree construction [4], association rules mining [5,6], k-means clustering [21,22], and Bayesian 
network learning [23] have been proposed. In these algorithms, all parties were assumed to be semi – 
honest. That is, every party would faithfully follow the protocol or algorithm, but tried to learn as much 
as possible about others. 
As discussed above, past research in privacy preserving data mining focuses on privacy of raw data. 
Though privacy of derived information has been mentioned [18], we are not aware of any research in 
time series privacy. We hope to raise the awareness of time series privacy issues by this paper. 
2.2. Time series data mining 
Because time series data is usually large and noisy, direct application of data mining algorithms on raw 
data is time-consuming and gives unreliable results. A lot of attention has been paid on preprocessing 
techniques that facilitate data mining tasks. Research in time series data mining mostly focuses on data 
preprocessing techniques, such as discretization and transformation [13,16,24], feature extraction and 
feature reduction [15]. Work has also been done in related techniques such as data representation [14] 
and similarity metrics [25,26]. 
The data mining tasks studied by researchers include subsequence matching [7,8], classification [10], 
clustering [11], time series modeling [12], and association rule mining [9]. 
It is clear that most research in time series data mining does not address privacy issues, let alone time 
series privacy issues. While current privacy preserving techniques can be applied to preserve snap-shot 
privacy in time series data, they are inadequate for protecting time series privacy. 
3. Time series privacy issues 
We identify privacy issues for time series data in addition to traditional privacy issues in data mining. 
Time series data from a data source can be regarded as a time-domain signal. All the characteristics of a 
time-domain signal can be potentially regarded as private information by the data provider. Below, we 
list common characteristics in time series data that a data provider may need to keep confidential. 
– Amplitude: Amplitude indicates the strength of a signal. This is the same as in traditional privacy 
research. 
– Average: The average signal strength over time. For example, for a series of sales data, average 
amplitude indicates the average sales. 
– Peak and trough: Peak and trough indicate extreme situations. The information is usually considered 
confidential as it may disclose extreme changes in underlying causes such as difficulties in money 
flow. 
– Trend: By observing trends of time series data, an adversary may predict future changes of time 
series data. Thus trend information should be protected from competitors as well. 
– Periodicity: Periodical changes in time series data indicate existence of periodically changing 
factors. For sales data of a store, the factor can be periodical changes in marketing strategies such as 
promotions which are usually regarded as confidential information for stores. Unlike the previous 
characteristics which are in time domain, periodicity is in frequency domain. 
There are other characteristics which may be regarded as confidential by some data providers. However, 
as an initial study on time series privacy, we focus on the common characteristics listed above. Since 
the data flow separation attack aims to recover the original signal, the attack may be effective to disclose 
these common characteristics. 
4. Threat model 
In this paper we assume that data providers care about the sensitive information contained in their 
time series data. To protect their privacy, data providers will only supply their data to trusted research 
companies. Research companies will aggregate time series data provided by different data providers 
according to different criteria. An example of aggregating sales data provided by auto manufacturers is 
shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, there is only one aggregation layer. In practice there can be many layers of 
aggregation because some research companies may aggregate data provided by other research companies 
or aggregate data provided by both original data providers and research companies. 
We assume research companies will publish aggregated data for profit or for public usage. The 
research companies will disclose criteria used in aggregation. But research companies will not disclose 
information of data sources, specifically identities of data providers to protect their privacy. 
We assume adversaries to have capabilities summarized as follows: 
– Adversaries can obtain aggregated data from research companies for a small amount of fee or for 
free. 
– Adversaries can not obtain data generated from original data sources because of lack of trust with 
original data sources. This assumption excludes the possibility of an original data provider being a 
privacy attacker. We do not study the case of compromised data provider in this paper. But obviously 
the data flow separation attack will be more effective if an adversary, being a provider of original 
data, can know part of original data aggregated by research companies. 
– Adversaries can obtain data aggregated according to different criteria. 
– Research companies have various data providers as their data sources and they do not want to 
disclose the composition of data sources. It is similar to an investment company does not want to 
disclose the composition of stocks in possess. 
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Fig. 1. An Example for Data Flow Model. 
The threat model M can be represented as M =<  F,G,O  >, where F is a set of original data sources, 
G is a set of aggregation operations, and O is a set of observations available to adversaries. Though 
observations are obtained by applying aggregation operations to data sources, O = G(F ), aggregation 
operations and data sources are unknown to adversaries. 
The model assumed in our paper is realistic. Many research companies compile weekly or monthly 
sales of large items, such as cars, TVs, computers, etc, from retailers or manufacturers. Each research 
company has its own sources and publishes its reports with aggregated totals. Since these reports are 
available with a small fee, someone can collect all these reports and try to separate data to recover original 
data. The manufacturers do not want to share data with parties other than trusted research companies, 
but would like to see the aggregated data to understand industry. 
5. Data flow separation attack 
In this section, we will first define the problem in the context of blind source separation and then 
describe how to apply the data flow separation attack in practice. 
� 
5.1. Blind source separation 
Blind source separation is a methodology in statistical signal processing to recover unobserved “source” 
signals from a set of observed mixtures of the signals. The separation is called “blind” to emphasize 
that the source signals are not observed and that the mixture is a black box to the observer. While no 
knowledge is available about the mixture, in many cases it can be safely assumed that source signals are 
independent. In its simplest form [27], the blind source separation model assumes n independent signals 
nF1(t), · · · , Fn(t) and n observations of mixture O1(t), · · · , On(t) where Oi(t) =  j=1 aijFj (t), where 
aij is the mix coefficient. The goal of blind source separation is to reconstruct the source signals F j (t) 
using only the observed data Oi(t), with the assumption of independence among the signals F j (t). A  
very nice introduction to the statistical principles behind blind source separation is given in [27]. The 
common methods employed in blind source separation are minimization of mutual information [28,29], 
maximization of nongaussianity [30,31] and maximization of likelihood [32,33]. 
5.2. Data flow separation as a blind source separation problem 
In this paper, we define an individual data flow as a series of time-stamped data generated by an original 
data source. An aggregate data flow is defined as the aggregate of individual data flows. Aggregate data 
flows are generated by research companies. If not specified, the phrase data flow in the remaining of this 
paper means the individual data flow for brevity. 
For an attacker who is interested in sensitive information contained in individual data flow, it would 
be very helpful to separate the individual data flows based on the aggregate data flows. Because the 
separation of the data flows can recover the pattern of data flows, they can be use for further attacks such 
as frequency matching attack described in Section 5.3. 
In this paper, we are interested in patterns carried in the time series data. For example, in Fig. 1, the 
1 1 1attacker can get a time series O1 = [o1, o2, · · · , o ] of the aggregate data flow from Research Company n 
A. We call n as the sample size in this paper. The attacker’s objective is to recover the time series 
Fi = [f1 
i, f2 
i , · · · , f i ] for each individual data flow. The time series F3 is contained in both aggregate n 
flows O1 and O2, i.e., O1 = F3 + F6, O2 = F2 + F3 + F4 + F5. 
In general, with l research companies and m individual data flows, we can rewrite the problem in 
vector-matrix notation, 
    
O1 F1    O2 F2      .  = Al×m  .  (1). .  .   . 
Ol Fm 
where Al×m is called the mixing matrix in blind source separation problems. 
Data flow separation can be achieved using blind source separation techniques. The individual data 
flows are independent from each other since the individual data flows are from different sources. Given the 
observations O1, O2, · · · , Ol, blind source separation techniques can be used to estimate the independent 
individual flows F1, F2, · · · , Fm by maximizing the independence between estimated individual data 
flows. 
The issues about the blind source separation method are summarized as follows. 
– Basic blind source separation algorithms require the number of observations to be greater than or 
equal to the number of independent sources. For data flow separation, it means l � m. Furthermore, 
we assume m = l in this paper since it is fairly straightforward to extend our idea to cases where 
l > m. 
– The l observations may have redundancy. In other words, the row vectors of the mixing matrix may 
be linearly dependent. The cost of the redundancy will be that some independent data flows are not 
separated. 
– The data flow estimations by blind source separation algorithms are usually lifted, scaled versions 
of the actual data flows. Sometimes, the estimated data flow may be of different sign than the 
actual data flow. However, the attacker can still find characteristics of the actual data flow from the 
estimated data flow. Also, heuristic approaches can be used to fine tune the estimation, which is an 
interesting topic for further research. 
5.3. Frequency matching attack 
After the data flows have been separated, a number of data flows, each with a given time series, have 
been determined to be included in the aggregate. 
We choose frequency spectrum matching to do further attack. Frequency spectrum can be generated 
by applying the Discrete Fourier Transform on time series data as below 
N−1 − 2πikj jX(k) =  fje N (2) 
j=0 
where f j denotes the jth data point in the time series data and N denotes the length of the time series and j 
then calculating the magnitude of the transformed data. We match frequency spectrum by correlation. 
The rationale for the use of frequency matching is two-fold: First, the dynamics of many data 
flows, such as sales, stock price, and weather, are characterized by their periodicities. By matching 
the frequency spectrum of a known data flow with the frequency spectrum of estimated data flows 
obtained by blind source separation techniques, we can identify corresponding flows with high accuracy. 
Second, frequency matching can easily remove the ambiguities introduced by the lifting and scaling in 
the estimated time series by removing the zero-frequency component. In summary, frequency spectrum 
analysis has excellent prerequisites to be highly effective. 
Frequency matching can be applied to match data flows separated from different attacks. After 
collecting a set of aggregate data flows according to different criteria, the attacker can select arbitrary 
subsets of aggregate data flows as groups and apply data flow separation techniques to the groups to 
recover individual data flows. If a data flow separated from a group matches with a data flow separated 
from another group, then these two data flows should be generated from the same source. Moreover, the 
source generating these two data flows should satisfy at least one aggregation criteria in each group. If 
the attacker can match a data flow with data flows separated from several groups, the attacker can largely 
reduce the anonymity or possibly determine the identity of the source generating the data flow since the 
source should satisfy at least one criteria in each of these groups of aggregate flows. To better utilize the 
data, the attacker can try all the possible combinations to group available aggregate data flows and then 
match the data flows separated from these groups. Of course, when the number of aggregate flows in a 
group is too small, the data flow separation technique can not separate all data flows because the number 
of observations is smaller than the number of independent components. We will study the limit of this 
grouping and matching method in our future research. 
� 
6. Evaluation 
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of data flow separation. We use the blind source 
separation algorithm proposed in [34] to separate the data flows. The accuracy of separation will be 
measured using correlation with actual flows. In our experiments, real stock market data [35] is used. 
6.1. Performance metrics 
In the following, we will adopt two metrics to evaluate the accuracy of data flow separation. Both 
metrics are based on a comparison of the separated data flows with the actual data flows. 
As first performance metric, we use mean square error (MSE), a widely used performance criterion 
in blind source separation research. Let FA = [f1 
A, f2 
A , · · · , fA] represent the time series of the actual n 
data flow and FB = [f1 
B , f2 
B , · · · , fB] represent the time series estimated by the blind source separation n 
algorithm. In order to match the time series FA with FB , we first need to scale and lift FB so that they 
have the same mean and variance. 
std(FA)
F j = · (FB −mean(FB ) · [1, 1, · · · , 1])B std(FB ) 
(3) 
+mean(FA) · [1, 1, · · · , 1], 
where std(F ) and mean(F ) denote the standard deviation and the average of time series F , respectively. 
The mean square error is defined as follows: 
‖FA − F j ‖2 BεA,B = . (4) 
n 
Since the times series FB can also be a flipped version of FA, we also need to match FA with −FB . 
As the second metric, we use correlation between the separated flow F B and the corresponding actual 
flow FA defined as follow: 
(fA −mean(FA))(fB −mean(FB ))i i iRFA,FB = (5)std(FA)std(FB ) 
6.2. A small example 
In this experiment, four time series of stock price selected from [35] are mixed into four aggregates. 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the actual data flows and separated data flows from the aggregates. 
We can observe for data flows 1, 2, and 3, the separated data flows are flipped, scaled and lifted 
versions of the corresponding actual data flows. We can also observe the resemblance between separated 
flow and the corresponding actual flow for data flow 4. 
Figure 3 shows the performance of data flow separation in terms of the metrics introduced in Section 
6.1. According to the correlation metric, the separated data flows are highly correlated to the actual data 
flows as shown in Fig. 3(a). In Fig. 3(b) both the separated data flow and its flipped time series are 
compared against the actual flows and the mean square error for each data flow shown in the figure is the 
smaller one. According to the mean square error metric 4 and 4, the reconstructed data flows are off by 
around 10% in comparison with the actual data flows. Both metrics indicate that the data flow separation 
is successful. In the following we will only use correlation to evaluate performance because the lifting 
and scaling in the mean square error metrics may introduce error. 
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Fig. 3. Performance of Data Flow Separation on a Small Example. 
6.3. Mixing degree 
In this set of experiments, we would like to study the effect of mixing degree on the performance of 
data flow separation. We define mixing degree as follows: 
average number of individual data flows mixed in aggregates 
Dmix = (6)
number of individual data flows 
It is equivalent as 
number of non-zero entries in Al×m
Dmix = . (7)
l × m 
Ten time series selected from stock data [35] are mixed randomly in this experiment to create ten 
aggregates. A total of 10000 randomly-generated full-rank 1 binary mixing matrices were used in this 
experiment. 
1Experiments on rank deficient mixing matrices are described in Section 6.4. 
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Fig. 4. Effect of Mixing Degree and Redundant Observations (Lower bar: 25 percentile, Upper bar: 75 percentile). 
Figure 4(a) shows the effect of mixing degree on the performance of data flow separation. We plot 
statistics of both average correlation and worst case correlation. In this paper average correlation is 
defined as mean of correlation between separated data flows and actual data flows for each trial. We use 
the term worst case to refer to the most accurately separated data flow in each trial. It corresponds to the 
worst privacy compromising in each trial. 
From Fig. 4(a), we can observe that data flow separation is effective since the separated flows are 
highly correlated to actual flows especially for the worst case. We can also observe that the performance 
of data flow separation is not sensitive to mixing degree for full-rank mixing matrices. This experiment 
indicates that a countermeasure to the data flow separation attack by simply increasing the mix degree is 
not effective. 
6.4. Redundant aggregate data flows 
In this set of experiments, we focus on the cases with redundant aggregate data flows. In our setting, 
redundant aggregate data flows mean that some aggregate data flows are linear combinations of other 
aggregate data flows. Redundant aggregate data flows will reduce the number of effective aggregate data 
flows. Redundant aggregate data flows are caused by rank deficient mixing matrices. 
To study the effect of redundant observations, we randomly generated 1000 mixing matrices for each 
possible rank. Ten data flows randomly selected from the stock data are mixed using the randomly-
generated mixing metrics of different ranks. 
Figure 4(b) shows the performance of the data flow separation algorithm with redundant observations. 
We can observe that the performance of data flow separation decreases as the number of redundant 
observations increases. The performance degrades because the number of knowns decreases. When 
the number of aggregate data flows is larger than the number of individual data flows, the data flow 
separation problem becomes an over-complete base problem in blind source separation literature. In 
general an over-complete base problem is harder to solve. 
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6.5. Dependence between individual data flows 
In this set of experiments, we study the effect of dependence between individual data flows on data 
flow separation performance. We did this series of experiments because of the fact that most blind source 
separation algorithms assume relative independence between actual signals. 
Groups of ten data flows are randomly picked from the stock data [35]. These groups of data flows 
have different average correlation among data flows in the same group. In this set of experiments, 
dependence between individual data flows is defined as average correlation between any pair of data 
flows in the group. The time series in each group are mixed randomly and we apply the data flow 
separation technique on the generated aggregates. 
Figure 5 shows that the performance of the data flow separation technique decreases when the depen-
dence among individual data flows increases. This happens because blind source separation algorithms 
used in data flow separation assume independence between underlying components. Even for the blind 
source separation algorithm [34] which takes advantage of both independence and timing structure of 
the underlying signals, the dependence among individual data flows can still degrade the performance 
of data flow separation attack. We can also observe that the worst case correlation is not sensitive to the 
dependence between individual data flows. 
6.6. Frequency matching 
In this subsection, we show the performance of the frequency matching attack proposed in Section 5.3. 
In this experiment, two groups of ten data flows are formed by selecting data flows from the stock dataset. 
Three data flows in both groups are the same. These two groups of data flows are mixed randomly to form 
two groups of aggregate data flows. Data flow separation is performed on the two groups of aggregate 
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Fig. 6. Performance of Frequency Matching. 
data flows. We identify common flows in both groups by matching frequency spectrums of separated 
data flows in two different groups. 
Figure 6 shows the correlation between three identified separated data flows in one group and the ten 
separated data flows in the other group. As shown in Fig. 6, we can easily find out the data flows common 
to both groups from correlation of frequency spectrums: Separated data flow 3, 4, and 7 in Group A 
correspond to separated data flow 10, 9, and 8 in Group B respectively. 
7. Discussion 
From the experiments in Section 6, it is apparent that aggregation methods are not sufficient to 
effectively counter data flow separation attacks. Additional measures are needed. 
One naive countermeasure can be adding independent noise into aggregate data flows to counter the 
data flow separation attack. This approach may not work because the noise and the original data flow 
are regarded as independent components and thus they can be separated by the blind source separation 
algorithm. 
According to our experiments, the following countermeasures will be effective against data flow 
separation attacks: 
– Increase the dependence among data flows by adding dependent noise to the data flows. Further 
research is needed to investigate how to optimally add noise so that privacy can be preserved and 
the performance of time series data mining will not be significantly affected. 
– Limit the number of aggregate data flows that can be obtained by adversaries so that the number 
of observations is much less than the number of independent components. This countermeasure 
requires cooperation among research companies and it is hard to be enforced. 
– Data sources should know from research companies about how the supplied data is going to be 
aggregated and restrict the usage of supplied data. 
Also, research in blind source separation shows most blind source separation algorithms fail when the 
signals mixed are Gaussian distributed. Therefore, another countermeasure against data flow separation 
attacks is padding each aggregate data flow so that the distribution of the aggregated data is Gaussian. 
But different classes of blind source separation algorithms that make use of the time structure of the 
signals can still separate the data flows [36,37]. 
As mentioned in [38], aggregation is a major technique used to preserve privacy in data mining. Since 
data flow separation attacks can separate individual data flows from aggregates, the aggregation technique 
based privacy-preserving data mining systems are potentially vulnerable to data flow separation attacks. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced the concept of privacy in time series data mining. We presented a new 
attack against privacy in time series data mining, called the data flow separation attack, which can be 
used either alone or in conjunction with other attacks to significantly reduce the effectiveness of privacy-
preserving techniques in time series data mining. The data flow separation attack is based on the blind 
source separation algorithms widely used to recover individual signals from mixtures of signals. Our 
experiments show that the attack is effective. With the aid of further attacks such as frequency matching 
attack, the data flow separation attack can be used to determine data sources of separate data flows. 
We discussed countermeasures against the data flow separation attack. Our future work will focus 
on countermeasures to balance privacy-preserving and performance of data mining. We also plan to 
analytically model the effectiveness of the attack. 
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